T1136: Create Account
Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.
How it's found
Detection Strategy for T1136 - Create Account across platforms: Adversary uses built-in OS tools or API calls to create local or domain accounts for persistence or lateral movement. Tools such as 'net user', PowerShell, or MMC snap-ins may be used. Detection focuses on Event ID 4720 paired with process lineage and user context. Adversary invokes 'useradd', 'adduser', or equivalent system commands or scripts to create local users. Detection focuses on command execution and audit trail of passwd/shadow file modifications. Adversary creates new users using 'dscl' commands, GUI tools, or by modifying user plist files. Detection includes monitoring dscl invocation and user-related plist changes. Adversary creates users via IAM/IdP API or portal (e.g., Azure AD, Okta). Detection involves monitoring API calls, admin action logs, and correlation with role assignments. Account creation via cloud service APIs or CLI, often associated with key generation. Monitored via CloudTrail or equivalent audit logs.
Sub-techniques
T1136.001: Local Account
Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. For example, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows <code>net user /add</code> command can be used to create a local account. In Linux, the `useradd` command can be used, while on macOS systems, the <code>dscl -create</code> command can be used. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, often via common Network Device CLI commands such as <code>username</code>, to ESXi servers via `esxcli system account add`, or to Kubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility. Adversaries may also create new local accounts on network firewall management consoles - for example, by exploiting a vulnerable firewall management system, threat actors may be able to establish super-admin accounts that could be used to modify firewall rules and gain further access to the network. Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
T1136.002: Domain Account
Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the <code>net user /add /domain</code> command can be used to create a domain account. Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
T1136.003: Cloud Account
Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. In addition to user accounts, cloud accounts may be associated with services. Cloud providers handle the concept of service accounts in different ways. In Azure, service accounts include service principals and managed identities, which can be linked to various resources such as OAuth applications, serverless functions, and virtual machines in order to grant those resources permissions to perform various activities in the environment. In GCP, service accounts can also be linked to specific resources, as well as be impersonated by other accounts for Temporary Elevated Cloud Access. While AWS has no specific concept of service accounts, resources can be directly granted permission to assume roles. Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection. Once an adversary has created a cloud account, they can then manipulate that account to ensure persistence and allow access to additional resources - for example, by adding Additional Cloud Credentials or assigning Additional Cloud Roles.
Standards mapping
Where this fits in a TurboPentest engagement
This weakness is not covered by the automated black-box pentest. IntegSec pentesters cover it in a manual engagement.
Frequently asked questions
What is T1136 Create Account?
Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.
Which tactics does T1136 belong to?
T1136 maps to the Persistence tactic.
Does TurboPentest test for Create Account?
This weakness is not covered by the automated black-box pentest. IntegSec pentesters cover it in a manual engagement.
Related MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- Persistence, Privilege EscalationT1037: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
- Execution, Persistence, Privilege EscalationT1053: Scheduled Task/Job
- Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, StealthT1078: Valid Accounts
- Persistence, Privilege EscalationT1098: Account Manipulation
- Persistence, Defense ImpairmentT1112: Modify Registry
- Initial Access, PersistenceT1133: External Remote Services
About this reference
These security references are maintained by IntegSec, an offensive-security firm whose team holds CISSP, OSCP, and OSCE certifications and has run thousands of penetration tests. Content is kept current as tools, standards, and attack techniques evolve.
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