CWE-1385: Missing Origin Validation in WebSockets
The product uses a WebSocket, but it does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
How it's found
Missing Origin Validation in WebSockets is a specific, narrowly defined instance of a broader pattern. Testers confirm it with targeted code review and a proof-of-concept input that exercises the exact code path this weakness describes.
WebSockets provide a bi-directional low latency communication (near real-time) between a client and a server. WebSockets are different than HTTP in that the connections are long-lived, as the channel will remain open until the client or the server is ready to send the message, whereas in HTTP, once the response occurs (which typically happens immediately), the transaction completes. A WebSocket can leverage the existing HTTP protocol over ports 80 and 443, but it is not limited to HTTP. WebSockets can make cross-origin requests that are not restricted by browser-based protection mechanisms such as the Same Origin Policy (SOP) or Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS). Without explicit origin validation, this makes CSRF attacks more powerful.
Consequences
- Varies by Context, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Read Application Data, Modify Application Data, DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart: The consequences will vary depending on the nature of the functionality that is vulnerable to CSRF. An attacker could effectively perform any operations as the victim. If the victim is an administrator or privileged user, the consequences may include obtaining complete control over the web application - deleting or stealing data, uninstalling the product, or using it to launch other attacks against all of the product's users. Because the attacker has the identity of the victim, the scope of the CSRF is limited only by the victim's privileges.
Mitigations
- Implementation: Enable CORS-like access restrictions by verifying the 'Origin' header during the WebSocket handshake.
- Implementation: Use a randomized CSRF token to verify requests.
- Implementation: Use TLS to securely communicate using 'wss' (WebSocket Secure) instead of 'ws'.
- Architecture and Design/Implementation: Require user authentication prior to the WebSocket connection being established. For example, the WS library in Node has a 'verifyClient' function.
- Implementation: Leverage rate limiting to prevent against DoS. Use of the leaky bucket algorithm can help with this.
- Implementation: Use a library that provides restriction of the payload size. For example, WS library for Node includes 'maxPayloadoption' that can be set.
- Implementation: Treat data/input as untrusted in both directions and apply the same data/input sanitization as XSS, SQLi, etc.
Where this fits in a TurboPentest engagement
This weakness is not covered by the automated black-box pentest. IntegSec pentesters cover it in a manual engagement.
Frequently asked questions
What is CWE-1385?
The product uses a WebSocket, but it does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
How do you find Missing Origin Validation in WebSockets?
Missing Origin Validation in WebSockets is a specific, narrowly defined instance of a broader pattern. Testers confirm it with targeted code review and a proof-of-concept input that exercises the exact code path this weakness describes.
What is the impact of CWE-1385?
Varies by Context, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Read Application Data, Modify Application Data, DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart: The consequences will vary depending on the nature of the functionality that is vulnerable to CSRF. An attacker could effectively perform any operations as the victim. If the victim is an administrator or privileged user, the consequences may include obtaining complete control over the web application - deleting or stealing data, uninstalling the product, or using it to launch other attacks against all of the product's users. Because the attacker has the identity of the victim, the scope of the CSRF is limited only by the victim's privileges.
Does TurboPentest test for Missing Origin Validation in WebSockets?
This weakness is not covered by the automated black-box pentest. IntegSec pentesters cover it in a manual engagement.
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Written and reviewed by
Michel Chamberland - Founder & CEO, IntegSec
CISSP, OSCP, OSCE, CEH, GIAC, CCSK · 20+ years in offensive security
Michel has spent 20+ years on offensive security teams including IBM X-Force Red and Trustwave SpiderLabs, leading penetration tests, red team engagements, and breach response for Fortune 500 customers. He is the founder of IntegSec and the architect of TurboPentest.
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