CWE-1323: Improper Management of Sensitive Trace Data
Trace data collected from several sources on the System-on-Chip (SoC) is stored in unprotected locations or transported to untrusted agents.
How it's found
Improper Management of Sensitive Trace Data is typically found by tracing untrusted input from where it enters the system to the point where it is used without the check or neutralization this weakness describes, combining manual code review with dynamic testing.
To facilitate verification of complex System-on-Chip (SoC) designs, SoC integrators add specific IP blocks that trace the SoC's internal signals in real-time. This infrastructure enables observability of the SoC's internal behavior, validation of its functional design, and detection of hardware and software bugs. Such tracing IP blocks collect traces from several sources on the SoC including the CPU, crypto coprocessors, and on-chip fabrics. Traces collected from these sources are then aggregated inside trace IP block and forwarded to trace sinks, such as debug-trace ports that facilitate debugging by external hardware and software debuggers. Since these traces are collected from several security-sensitive sources, they must be protected against untrusted debuggers. If they are stored in unprotected memory, an untrusted software debugger can access these traces and extract secret information. Additionally, if security-sensitive traces are not tagged as secure, an untrusted hardware debugger might access them to extract confidential information.
Vulnerable vs. safe
The traces do
not have any privilege level attached to them. All
collected traces can be viewed by any debugger (i.e., SoC
designer, OEM debugger, or end user).Some of the
traces are SoC-design-house secrets, while some are OEM
secrets. Few are end-user secrets and the rest are
not security-sensitive. Tag all traces with the
appropriate, privilege level at the source. The bits
indicating the privilege level must be immutable in
their transit from trace source to the final, trace
sink. Debugger privilege level must be checked before
providing access to traces.Consequences
- Read Memory: An adversary can read secret values if they are captured in debug traces and stored unsafely.
Mitigations
- Implementation: Tag traces to indicate owner and debugging privilege level (designer, OEM, or end user) needed to access that trace.
Where this fits in a TurboPentest engagement
TurboPentest's agentic pentest is powerful and covers a broad range of issues automatically. This particular class is best confirmed in a manual IntegSec engagement, where human pentesters apply deeper methodology and a larger context window than any automated pass.
Frequently asked questions
What is CWE-1323?
Trace data collected from several sources on the System-on-Chip (SoC) is stored in unprotected locations or transported to untrusted agents.
How do you find Improper Management of Sensitive Trace Data?
Improper Management of Sensitive Trace Data is typically found by tracing untrusted input from where it enters the system to the point where it is used without the check or neutralization this weakness describes, combining manual code review with dynamic testing.
What is the impact of CWE-1323?
Read Memory: An adversary can read secret values if they are captured in debug traces and stored unsafely.
Does TurboPentest test for Improper Management of Sensitive Trace Data?
TurboPentest's agentic pentest is powerful and covers a broad range of issues automatically. This particular class is best confirmed in a manual IntegSec engagement, where human pentesters apply deeper methodology and a larger context window than any automated pass.
Related CWEs
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