CWE-1303: Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources
Hardware structures shared across execution contexts (e.g., caches and branch predictors) can violate the expected architecture isolation between contexts.
How it's found
Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources is typically found by tracing untrusted input from where it enters the system to the point where it is used without the check or neutralization this weakness describes, combining manual code review with dynamic testing.
Modern processors use techniques such as out-of-order execution, speculation, prefetching, data forwarding, and caching to increase performance. Details about the implementation of these techniques are hidden from the programmer's view. This is problematic when the hardware implementation of these techniques results in resources being shared across supposedly isolated contexts. Contention for shared resources between different contexts opens covert channels that allow malicious programs executing in one context to recover information from another context. Some examples of shared micro-architectural resources that have been used to leak information between contexts are caches, branch prediction logic, and load or store buffers. Speculative and out-of-order execution provides an attacker with increased control over which data is leaked through the covert channel. If the extent of resource sharing between contexts in the design microarchitecture is undocumented, it is extremely difficult to ensure system assets are protected against disclosure.
Consequences
- Read Application Data, Read Memory: Microarchitectural side-channels have been used to leak specific information such as cryptographic keys, and Address Space Layout Randomization (ALSR) offsets as well as arbitrary memory.
Mitigations
- Architecture and Design: Microarchitectural covert channels can be addressed using a mixture of hardware and software mitigation techniques. These include partitioned caches, new barrier and flush instructions, and disabling high resolution performance counters and timers.
- Requirements: Microarchitectural covert channels can be addressed using a mixture of hardware and software mitigation techniques. These include partitioned caches, new barrier and flush instructions, and disabling high resolution performance counters and timers.
Where this fits in a TurboPentest engagement
TurboPentest's agentic pentest is powerful and covers a broad range of issues automatically. This particular class is best confirmed in a manual IntegSec engagement, where human pentesters apply deeper methodology and a larger context window than any automated pass.
Frequently asked questions
What is CWE-1303?
Hardware structures shared across execution contexts (e.g., caches and branch predictors) can violate the expected architecture isolation between contexts.
How do you find Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources?
Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources is typically found by tracing untrusted input from where it enters the system to the point where it is used without the check or neutralization this weakness describes, combining manual code review with dynamic testing.
What is the impact of CWE-1303?
Read Application Data, Read Memory: Microarchitectural side-channels have been used to leak specific information such as cryptographic keys, and Address Space Layout Randomization (ALSR) offsets as well as arbitrary memory.
Does TurboPentest test for Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources?
TurboPentest's agentic pentest is powerful and covers a broad range of issues automatically. This particular class is best confirmed in a manual IntegSec engagement, where human pentesters apply deeper methodology and a larger context window than any automated pass.
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